TÍTULO: Intraregímenes políticos autoritarios en Rusia y el espacio postsoviético (análisis histórico-político comparativo).

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RESUMEN: El artículo intenta aclarar la naturaleza de las características específicas de la adaptación del sistema político democrático a las condiciones tradicionalistas en el contexto de la investigación científica política comparada. Sobre la base de la experiencia histórica y política del imperio ruso, la Unión Soviética, la Federación de Rusia señaló que en Rusia y en algunos países de la CEI se ha formado una autoritaria-modernización de regímenes políticos presidenciales que la implementación de una misión poderosa y un estado fuerte puede contribuir a la aceleración de la ejecución de los programas de desarrollo. La definición propuesta de régimen político intrapolítico refleja el funcionamiento de configuraciones de poder más específicamente históricas dentro de los regímenes clásicos, generalmente de naturaleza autoritaria y presidencial en forma política y jurídica.

PALABRAS CLAVES: régimen político, régimen intrapolítico, autoritarismo, liderazgo, historia política.
TITLE: Authoritarian political intraregimes in Russia and the post-Soviet space (comparative historical and political analysis).

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ABSTRACT: The article attempts to clarify the nature of the specific characteristics of the adaptation of the democratic political system to traditionalist conditions in the context of comparative political scientific research. Based on the historical and political experience of the Russian empire, the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation noted that in Russia and in some CIS countries an authoritarian-modernization of presidential political regimes has formed that the implementation of a powerful mission and a strong state can contribute to the acceleration of the execution of development programs. The proposed definition of intrapolitical political regime reflects the functioning of more specifically historical configurations of power within classical regimes, generally of an authoritarian and presidential nature in political and legal form.

KEY WORDS: political regime, intra-political regime, authoritarianism, leadership, political history.

INTRODUCTION.
The present stage of political development requires studying the key parameters, factors, and characteristics of political and socio-economic transformations in the CIS countries, as well as their comparative analysis from the perspective of neo-institutionalism.
To correct some established political assessments and expert judgments, it is imperative not only to traditionally expand the range of empirical sources analyzed but also to implement a research project for a comparative analysis of the political transformations of post-Soviet states. The latter allows revealing general and special patterns in the process of post-communist transformations.

Especially relevant is the study of the phenomenon of "political authoritarianism", which explains the power self-organization and self-defense method of dictatorships established in backward and middle-developed countries". The question of the political will of authoritarian individuals and institutions, as well as the degree of their objective or subjective conditionality, is debatable. Postmodern political science concepts are based on the recognition of authoritarianism as an antagonistic order in relation to democracy. Reducing authoritarianism to a narrow interpretation of the dictatorial political regime limits the knowledge of contradictory political reality.

The socio-political system of modern capitalism periodically enters a state of crisis and this requires timely adaptation of market and power configurations (Petras I&Veitmeyer.2003). Wil and Ariel Durant subtly observed that "in order to adapt to new conditions and in order to survive, the imitative majority follows the original minority, which in turn follows the creative pioneer hero which includes all these Pasteurs, Morse, fords, Wright brothers, Marx, Lenins, Mao-Zedong..." (Durant W. & Durant A.). The concept of ‘political regime’ is actively used to classify forms of government and their interactions with socio-political systems.

DEVELOPMENT.

Materials and methods.

Max Weber, Gabriel Almond, Seymour Martin Lipset, Raymond Aron, Talcott Parsons, Robert Michels, Hannah Arendt, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Maurice Duverger, Carl Joachim Friedrich, L. Shapiro, R. Gestil noted that political regimes operate within the framework of socio-political systems, which are characterized by objectified methods of sovereignty, the principles of functioning of governmental branches, the participation of the opposition in political life, etc. Regimes
classification uses such criteria as authoritarianism and pluralism, centralism and bureaucracy, etatism and anarchism, egalitarianism and elitism, totalitarianism and democracy, etc. (Tsygankov A. P. 1995).

In contrast to the political system, the political regime is more tied to the subjective factors of the historical process, to the personalities of political leaders and sovereigns, and the current socio-political situation. Domestic political scientists V.N. Abramov, M.G. Anokhin, V.A. Akchasov, A.P. Butenko, A.L. Gromyko, C.Yu. Kashkin, S.A. Kireeva, A.I. Kovler, A.M. Migranyan, E.N. Moshchelkov, A.V. Oblonsky, A.M. Salmin, N.A. Sakharov, E.G. Soloviev, E.P. Teplov, A.P. Tsygankov, R.A. Khomeleva, V.P. Chervony, L.M. Entin A.S. Panarin, V.P. Pugachev, A.I. Soloviev, O.F. Shabrov considered the determining stages in the formation of the concept of ‘political regime’, analyzed and systematized existing modern scientific approaches to its understanding established in modern political science, and presented a specific definition of this category. The literature shows that the political regime as a political and legal category is characterized by the relationship between the concepts of political and state regimes (Kurskova G. Y. M. 2010), the form of government, civil society, and the political system (Shipunov G. V. 2011).

The scientific literature suggests determining the regime by the degree of political freedom of citizens, as the framework of its necessary implementation, and as the degree of effectiveness of state power (Paigina D. I. 2015). There is also a disagreement on such issues as the influence of the institutional structure of authoritarian regimes; the role of formal and informal political practices in the context of the logic of the development of autocracies; parameters of the choice of political leaders, actors of incumbents and the opposition; the consequences of the spread and development of authoritarian regimes, and the reasons for the freezing of democratic transit in post-communist countries (Makarenko B. I. Melvil A. Yu 2014).

Researchers generally agree that the political regime intrinsically includes both administerial methods and means of exercising power, as well as ideological characteristics, but it is hardly probable to change public consciousness with the help of administerial technologies since it requires strategic
work with ideas, values, and attitudes, as well as their analysis ‘through their unity, differences, and interactions’ (Kudryavtsev Yu. A. 2012). The rotations of the parliamentary, the parliamentary-presidential, and the presidential-parliamentary regimes were observed in many countries (Emirov R. M. 2016). However, the problems of transition from authoritarianism to democracy are not the only concern for the post-Soviet states, as much as the issues of institutionalization and consolidation of the political regime (Borisov N. 2011).

The research of this phenomenon was carried out on specific historical materials based on previously conducted studies and publications by the authors (Kislitsyn S. A., Petrovas. V. Terenteva M. S. 2019). The authors apply comparative methods in political science, historical, and systemic contexts, which allowed determining general trends in the evolution of political regimes and their variations. Neo-institutionalism also served as the methodological basis, suggesting that institutions represent ‘rules of the game’ that rational individuals create to facilitate interactions with each other. The literature highlights a model of an authoritarian dogmatic personality based on a cognitive closure organized around the belief that strong power is necessary; such personality forms a rigid structure of intolerance towards others.

Theoretical background.

The first political regime in the framework of the early feudal monarchy can be considered the rule of the early Rurik dynasty, which was featured by the autonomy of local princes, the preservation of military-democratic traditions of veche popular assembly, heathen beliefs, and military expansion. Russia reached its political peak under Yaroslav the Wise when the centralization of the ancient Russian state was at the possible highest level. Feudal-republican intra-political regimes developed in Novgorod and Pskov functioned based on the leading role of the boyar (seignoral) elite. The creation of this regime, or, as we say, the intra-political regime, is explained by the influence of the European democratic tradition and, particularly, the influence of the Hanseatic League (Isaev B. A. 2013).
A parity princely-boyar intra-political regime was formed in the Principality of Galicia–Volhynia. In Vladimir-Suzdal principality, which was the center of the northeastern outskirts of the former Kievan Rus’, a grand-ducal intra-political regime was formed; the role of the veche and the boyars was demoted to secondary. Although the Vladimir-Suzdal principality entered a period of civil strife and disintegration and was subjected to a dreadful invasion of the Mongol empire, nevertheless, the tradition of the grand-ducal political regime was put into practice as soon as the conditions for this arose.

The influence of the Mongolian statehood on the formation of political regimes in northeastern Russia cannot be overestimated, although this factor cannot be considered as the absolute beginning of the national state. The statecraft of the Golden Horde is described by historians as military-feudal. The political regime of the Lithuanian-Ruthenian state was significantly different from Muscovy since a European version of vassalage developed here without servile submission to the autocrat. It can be considered as a more progressive intra-variant, which was not established in Russia due to the egoism of the Catholic nobility of Lithuania.

The political regime of Ivan the Terrible was designed to eliminate the remnants of feudal fragmentation, create integrated government machinery and expand the territory of Muscovy. Initially, these goals were achieved within the framework of the temporary intra-political regime of the Select Council by decent methods. But the tsar was not satisfied with the pace of transformation, and he switched to methods of accelerated centralization along the paths of terror. This second temporary terrorist intra-political regime of 1562-1570 within the framework of the reign of Ivan the Terrible had received the name ‘oprichnina’.

After the end of the Rurik dynasty, the establishment of an estate of the realm monarchy proceeded with the rise of the influence of the Assembly of the Land (zemsky sobor), which realized the right to elect monarchs. Almost the entire XVII century is characterized by the estate of the realm since the assemblies acquired the prerogatives of the legislator and the supreme executive power, including even the highest court. The reign of Aleksey Mikhailovich (Alexis of Russia) gradually acquired more
and more absolutist-autocratic features. Peter the Great put all the initiated reforms based on forcing and coercion and brought them to the creation of an absolutist Empire. After the death of Peter the Great, the mode of power was constantly changing; moreover, personalized intra-political regimes arose within its framework. They can be divided into two varieties: 1) the anti-national pro-German absolutist regime; 2) the rule of the noble political elite. In 1762, as a result of the coup, the wife of Peter III of Russia Catherine II, most commonly known as Catherine the Great, came to power; her reign is estimated by historians as enlightened absolutism. The name of Alexander I became a genericized name for the political regime of the first quarter of the XIX century. Some particular reforms implemented by the emperor under the influence of the Private Committee suggest that the political regime of these years can be profiled as authoritarian liberalism, which represents the development of the enlightened absolutism. The coming to power of Nicholas I, notorious as the executioner of the Decembrists, meant the conservation of the traditionalist autocratic internal policies, both in form and content. Police despotism has become the main feature of the intra-political regime of the second quarter of the XIX century.

The authoritarian and reformist political statecraft of Alexander II was ended by his successor, Alexander III. The conservative counter-reformist regime continued to function during the reign of Nicholas II. The first period of his reign was relatively calm - up until the first Russian revolution of 1905-1907. Under the influence of revolutionary actions, Russia gradually became a no longer absolute monarchy, but partially limited in certain elements to the ‘Duma monarchy’ (referring to the influence of the State Assembly).

The coup of 1917 February Revolution established a republican political system and a regime of dual power without its constitutional entrenchment. Both of intra-regimes by Alexander Guchkov and Alexander Kerensky were transient. This stage should have ended with the establishment of either the right-wing military (Lavr Kornilov) or the left communist dictatorship. The second option was implemented in the course of the October Revolution; the legitimization of the Bolsheviks took place due to the existence of the Soviet parallel power.
Deployment of the intraparty strife (which often took on quite a personal character) has begun after the departure of the Leninist-Bolshevik intra-political regime from the political arena; this led to the formation of an intra-political regime within the framework of the Soviet-Communist system - the Stalinist-Bolshevik political regime. Certain elements of state control over society were traced already under Vladimir Lenin; under Joseph Stalin, they assumed a universal character. The totalitarian Stalin-Bolshevik regime was covered by the 1936 Constitution, but in reality, it was a personified military-police intra-political regime that was carrying out massive political repressions.

Nikita Khrushchev came to power soon after Stalin’s death. His anti-Stalinist activity was of a reformist nature. At the same time, his risky and utopian programs forced the party-state nomenclature elite to remove him from power within the framework of existing legal norms. Leonid Brezhnev and his entourage pursued a political course towards stability and conservatism. All around, despite Khrushchev and Brezhnev’s diversity as leaders of the state and the party, the existence of a common nomenclature-communist regime of power is manifestly obvious; the latter consists of two intra-political regimes, related by the personalities of their leaders.

Perestroika (reformation) in the political sphere led to the revival of the multiparty system and the pushing of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) to second positions in state administration. It also led to the establishment of the Presidency and, in turn, caused the formation of a specific Soviet intra-political regime of Mikhail Gorbachev, which included elements of the Soviet system and sources of the new anti-Soviet system. Having gained power in August 1991, Boris Yeltsin carried out several measures that went beyond the framework of the then Constitution of the USSR; first of all, he signed the Belovezha Accords on the dissolution of the USSR and liquidated the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR and the Soviet power itself in October 1993.

The political system functioning at the present stage is enshrined in the 1993 Constitution of Russia. It appears as a presidential republic with a formal statement of the equality and independence of the three branches of government, but actually concentrating all the levers of government in the hands of the president, who is out of control throughout his entire term magistrates. Within the framework of
the new democratic system and the authoritarian-liberal political regime at the turn of the XX and XXI centuries, a new Putin's intra-political regime was formed. The Russian model of the distribution of power has acquired rigidly authoritarian features inherent in developing countries (Попов С.В. 2011). But this regime of power operates based on the Constitution adopted during the presidency of Boris Yeltsin.

The Yeltsin’s model was described in the literature as oligarchic-democratic, and the regime of Vladimir Putin, who counted on real political independence, supra-party system and statehood, as liberal authoritarianism. Some political scientists have begun to use the term ‘managed democracy’ to define this political regime (Baranov N. A. 2007). Other authors use the concept of a hybrid regime, which is characterized by personification and undivided power, as well as by legitimization of power in a democratic way (Khakimov R. S. Khomenko V. V., Abdurakhmanov R. F., Khusnutdinova A. T. 2013).

The essence of traditional Russian autocracy was manifested primarily in the personality of monarchs, leaders and modern presidents. The autocratic form of governance is highly dependent on random personality traits and therefore more easily disintegrates. The rampage of oprichnina and ‘playing fool for God's sake’ by Ivan the Terrible, the ‘lifeless’ conservatism of Nicholas I, jesuitism and truly satanical will of Joseph Stalin designated the highest points of development of Russian despotic statehood and at the same time predetermined three great catastrophes of Russian statecraft (Lubsky A.V.1998).

Arch Getty believes that archaic political practices are peculiar to modern Russia more than other modern state systems. Patrimonialism, clientelism, as well as quite some other traditional practices, is the most common among developed industrial societies in Russia; they are also most tenacious and have played the leading role for the longest time (Arch Getty.2016). Thus, the development of a historical monarchical mentality is clearly manifested in political regimes that have repeatedly changed in the history of Russia.
In the political history of the former republics of the USSR, there are many common points related to the presence in the past of the Imperial core led by Russian autocrats, then the Soviet Communist center of the totalitarian state. Therefore, we will not pay special attention to them. But in the post-Soviet history, one can distinguish in the former Soviet republics, along with the current democratic regime of power, internal intra-political regimes. Here are some examples. Since 1992, a ‘presidential-parliamentary’ republic functioned in Ukraine - coupled with a president who practically did not rule. Then, it was turned to the parliamentary-presidential, which again changed later in the opposite direction. The change of emphasis in the relationship between the institution of presidency and parliamentarism in Ukraine became the inherent cause of constant conflicts of political actors and, of course, exacerbated the intra-elite struggle (Kislitsyn S. A., Petrova S. V. 2017).

Different fluctuations were observed between helpless pluralism and the policy of dominant power with a gradual slide towards consolidated authoritarianism in later Leonid Kuchma years, the restoration of dysfunctional democracy under Viktor Yushchenko, and the expressive manifestation of authoritarian tendencies under Viktor Yanukovych (Baranov N.A 2011). Kyiv initiated a military operation against the people of Donbas under the cover of ‘anti-terrorist action’.

The intra-political regime headed by businessman Petro Poroshenko officially positioned itself as a democratic, market-based, European-oriented, etc. However, the alleged ban on the communist movement of Ukraine as a phenomenon, the elimination of anti-regime political opposition, the ban on several media, including Russian TV channels, the monopoly of official ideology, terrorist methods of pressure, the ban on anti-system opposition, universal control of the media, the militarization of all spheres of society, aggression against disobedient regions, the militarized rise to power (or through the pressure of ideology-driven masses) - all these are classic signs of a totalitarian regime.

In Ukraine, the model of a Bandera-fascist regime began to take shape, including militant Ukrainian chauvinism (based on anti-Russian prejudice), anti-communism, and latent anti-Semitism (Degtyar And .2017), but in the classical sense, it is quite incorrect to consider the Ukrainian regime as Nazi-
type since not only elements of the Nazi political format, but also facts of civic activism of a national-democratic nature were observed, which is proved by President Volodymyr Zelensky rise to power in 2019.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Belarus (for some time) was a parliamentary republic led by Stanislav Shushkevich. Under the 1994 Constitution, Belarus became a unitary democratic presidential republic with the liberal intra-regime of Stanislav Shushkevich and the long-playing intra-regime of ‘managed democracy’ by Alexander Lukashenko existing within its framework. According to most experts, with the departure of Lukashenko from the world of politics, this intra-regime, and maybe the political system in general, will significantly change.

Dynamics of the democratic process in Transcaucasia is distinctly differed by the pace of adaptability of political regimes to demands of the modern reality; intra-options are observed in this area no less prominently than in other CIS countries. In Georgia, the intra-political regime of Zviad Gamsakhurdia was replaced by ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union Eduard Shevardnadze; Shevardnadze resigned in the November 2003 to bloodless ‘Rose Revolution’ led by Mikheil Saakashvili and his political allies. However, on 2 October 2012, Saakashvili admitted his party's defeat in Georgia's parliamentary election against the Georgian Dream coalition led by the tycoon Bidzina Ivanishvili. The 2013 presidential race was won by big business protégé Giorgi Margvelashvili, and the 2018 election - by former French diplomat Salome Zourabichvili. Thus, billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili became the real sole leader in the country and formed the new latent-authoritarian regime of power.

A new intra-regime emerged in the region, which condemned Saakashvili’s authoritarianism but retained all of his political guidelines for foreign and domestic policy. Such regimes also operate in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, separated from Georgia.

The political statecraft of Armenia generally can be called ‘hybrid’ or intermediate, since it combines the features of both authoritarianism and democracy. In democratic Armenia, the intra-regime of Levon Ter-Petrosyan was replaced in 1998 by the intra-regime of Robert Kocharyan, and in 2008 -
by Serzh Sargsyan. Despite the transition to a parliamentary form of government, an attempt was made to maintain the semi-authoritarian Sargsyan’s intra-regime. However, as a result of public unrest, a new regime of Nikol Pashinyan came to power (Safarian A. 2018).

Also, in Azerbaijan, a hybrid political regime was established with the removal of the representative of the Communist Party Ayaz Mutallibov from power. Such a regime combined the democratic norms of the constitution with the authoritarianism of senior management, and with elements of hereditary power of the eastern type. The intra-political regime of former Azerbaijani Popular Front leader Abulfaz Elchibey was replaced by the intra-regime of Major-General of KGB Heydar Aliyev. Modern Azerbaijan appears to be consisting of the personal power of President Ilham Aliyev, the powerful party of the state, and weak opposition; the current situation is also featured by the close interaction of bodies of government with business organizations.

The political regimes of Central Asian countries are characterized by a tough presidential-authoritarian regime with conservative paternalistic nationalism, except for Kyrgyzstan, where unstable democracy is being formed (Baranov N. A. 2011). Due to stability and the absence of shifts of leaders, the regimes and even intra-regimes in these regions rarely change. The regime of authoritarian power of President Nursultan Nazarbayev has been functioning in Kazakhstan for almost 30 years. And even after the election of the new president Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in 2019, Nazarbayev maintains the position of the ‘leader of the nation’.

In Tajikistan, the authoritarian regime of President Emomali Rahmon was established after the civil war; his rule is commonly regarded as a dictatorship. In Uzbekistan, the regime of the personal power of President Islam Karimov has been maintained for a long time; it was later replaced by the intra-political regime of Shavkat Mirziyoyev. Until 2006, a super-presidential intra-regime (in fact, dictatorship and personality cult) of the ‘president for life’ of Turkmenistan Saparmurat Niyazov (Türkmenbaşy, meaning Head of the Turkmen) had functioned in Turkmenistan. It was replaced by a more advanced new authoritarian intra-regime by Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow (Omarov K. 2018).
A national-democratic regime was formed in Moldova, within the framework of which were operating the nationalist intra-regimes of Mircea Snegur and Petru Lucinschi, the national-communist intra-regime of V. Voronin, the parliamentary-presidential regime of M. Ghimpu, M. Lupu, N. Timofti, and I. Dodon. (Fokina L. 2017) A pro-Russian people's democratic intra-regime also operates in the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic.

Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia should be also mentioned in this context since these countries had developed an almost common nationalist pseudo-democratic regime with elements, on the one hand, of consolidated democracy, and, on the other, a course towards the glorification of local fascists. National democratic regimes have manifested some signs of ‘defective democracy’, along with several other distinctive features of the Baltic regimes (Seredenko S. 2018). At the same time, it should be noted that there are virtually no personal intra-political regimes in these countries since their heads of state are somewhat deprived of sovereign independence and pursue a policy under the strict control of the European Union and NATO.

The intra-regime can be virtually presidential, with or without signs of authoritarianism, a simple authoritarian regime, and also a national-leadership regime. This tendency was manifested in Russia, during the existence of intra-regimes of Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin. A similar picture is observed in Kazakhstan (Nazarbayev’s intra-regime), in Belarus (Lucashenko), and in Armenia (Sargsyan), as well as in Georgia during the term of Saakashvili, and in Lithuania during Dalia Grybauskaité presidency. However, an authoritarian-leadership type of regime has not developed in the parliamentary republics of Latvia, Estonia, and Moldova, in Ukraine, as well as in Moldova, Latvia and Estonia because of the lack of formation of national leadership, as the nations of these states are divided into several parts, in contrast to relatively unified (in terms of national-civil relations) Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan.

The political statecraft of Russia is a permanently changing factor within the framework of a particular political system of society, a set of certain determinations that are adequate to the organization of political power in the country, and also within a set of cultural and historical factors.
The foundation of the political regime in modern Russia and other CIS countries is represented by a comprehensive presidential power, which, according to the constitutions of these states, is the guarantor of the executive, legislative and judicial powers. In the 1990s its real effectiveness was somewhat insignificant since the activity of the President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin was manifested largely in the personnel policy in the highest echelons of power and led to the dominance of the executive branch of government. Yeltsin has begun as a hope of the nation but ended his political activity as a low-ranking authoritarian leader.

A significant increase in the effectiveness of state power during Putin’s presidency was also followed by governmental ability to solve the main problems of the modern development of Russian society, but only in an authoritarian way. Amendments to the 2020 Constitution grant more institutional prerogatives to the Parliament and the Court but retain the presidential character of the regime and allow Vladimir Putin to take the highest office in the country for the fifth time.

Results and discussion.
Currently, Russia is undergoing the process of institutional stabilization of the presidential regime, which has an authoritarian and personalized character, obviously associated with the personality of Vladimir Putin.

The relative stability of the existing political regime is carried out by relying on the state security, defense, and law enforcement agencies, as well as by the monopolization of federal electronic media and ITs to form and mobilize public consciousness. The historical mental matrix of public opinion is actively used, which is associated with the memory of the victorious great Patriotic war, Patriotic traditions, the worldview of the Russian Orthodox Church, the desire to serve the Russian Cossacks, and others.

The Historical consciousness of Russians is evaluated as an important resource of national security policy, the formation of civil identity of young people. Attempts are made to update certain social slogans in order to appeal to the Soviet labor enthusiasm. (Just remember the award of the title "Hero
of labor” to the oligarch Rotenberg). The proposed expansion of the powers of the Parliament, the constitutional court and the state Council, even while maintaining the leading role of the post of President, rationalizes the political system and removes the question of the exploitation of the monarchical mentality and the mandatory personalization of power in Russia. It is considered that in the future, as the Constitution improves, it will be possible to switch the personal type of ensuring the legitimacy of the presidential political regime into a more rational and bureaucratic structural type.

The characteristic features of the presidential regimes of Belarus and Kazakhstan are in many ways similar to the Russian ones, which led to their mutual attraction and the formation of an integrative interstate association. The political leaders of these republics Lukashenko and Nazarbayev are the direct descendants of the party-Soviet nomenclature elite; they are using the norms of the modern electoral system and the possibilities of the presidential regimes they have formed for opportunistic purposes. Positioning themselves as national leaders and gaining mass support of voters through their activities, they formed authoritarian-leadership regimes with an abundance of elements of the cult of their personalities. At the same time, these regimes have a modernizing orientation, are focused on allied relations with Russia, participate in discussions and criticism of the tendency to rewrite the history of the great Patriotic war and the Second world war in General, and generally preserve elements of the Soviet identity.

Currently, there is no single universally accepted ideology for the development of the integration of political regimes of authoritarian-leader modernization type in the post-Soviet space. Russia and partially Belarus and Kazakhstan, as the most powerful integrational geopolitical centers, are putting forward an updated ideology of the Eurasian unified post-Soviet space. The authoritarian regimes of the Central Asian countries support this trend to one degree or another.

Paternalism, etatism, and faith in the country's top leader, who are struggling with the political elite, which perverts his political course, are still quite common on the territory of Russian Eurasian civilization. The personality of the ruler is very important due to the populational mental specifics, which largely determines the real invariant of the prevailing political regime that has developed over
a certain period within the framework of the existing socio-political system. Such an invariant of the regime can be defined as ‘intra-political regime’.

CONCLUSIONS.
In the process of developing a democratic system in the post-Soviet countries and the emergence of its institutional distortions, authoritarian regimes are usually formed based on the firm establishment in power of the political leaders who possess a set of features of an authoritarian personality. An authoritarian leader can become a national political leader of a charismatic type. This type of politician embodies not only personalistic qualities but also demonstrates the totality of authoritarian methods of political leadership. Due to the sociocultural characteristics of the post-Soviet space, the credibility and experience of an effective ruler are of great importance, which largely determines the real invariant of the prevailing political regime that has developed over a certain period within the framework of the existing socio-political system. This internal mode invariant can be defined as ‘intra-political regime’. This concept allows for deeper operationalization of research within the framework of traditional concepts of authoritarianism and totalitarianism.

It seems possible to conclude that all countries in the post-Soviet space without exception (behind some peculiarities of Russia) have developed national-democratic regimes with different variations; internal intra-political regimes, usually of an authoritarian nature, were formed and replaced within this framework.

The authors are not in agreement with the assertion that the ‘color revolutions’ in Georgia, Ukraine and other countries took place because the ruling leaders were not able to answer new challenges since everything happened in a different way. Moreover, this can be traced to countries where leaders did not allow deviant development. Among them are soft-authoritarian, hard-authoritarian, liberal-authoritarian, authoritarian-democratic, and even authoritarian-neo-fascist outlines of power, formed under pressure from the leaders of these countries.
Russia has an authoritarian-modernization type of presidential political regime of a relatively democratic nature with a significant role of leaders’ personalities. The factor of personality contributed to the accelerated or delayed implementation of development programs within the framework of an objective agenda of tasks pretty much in all countries.

Authoritarianism and the presidency in the post-Soviet space are to some extent objective and immanently interdependent. As the evidence from practice shows, the presidents in the post-Soviet space countries, within the framework of their authoritarian intra-regimes, implemented their solutions to problems and led countries to various changes and a certain development.

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